ABSTRACT We address a robust beamforming design and power allocation problem for a one-way multi-antenna relay network, where the multi-antenna source implements communication with the multiantenna destination via a decode-and-forward (DF) relay in the presence of the multiple single-antenna eavesdroppers. The eavesdroppers can only overhear the information flowed from the relay to the destination in the second hop. We aim to maximize the worst-case secrecy rate in the condition that the global channel state information (CSI) is imperfect. To this end, we propose the joint beamforming and power allocation design for the worst-case secrecy rate maximization. However, our proposed design constitutes a nonconvex problem, which involves an infinite number of constraints because of the imperfect CSI. To make the problem more tractable, we approximate the problem into several tractablesemidefinite programs by semidefinite relaxation, successive convex approximation, and S-procedure techniques, and we propose an iterative algorithm to solve the problem. Furthermore, we show that the proposed algorithm is also applicable for the case the Gaussian wiretap model, where only the eavesdroppers' CSI is imperfect. Simulation results validate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security has been widely concerned and recognized as a critical issue in wireless communication networks recently, because the openness of the wireless medium allows unintended receivers to potentially eavesdrop on the transmitted messages. As a promising technique to guarantee the communication security, physical layer security (PLS) technique has attracted increasing attention. The basic idea of PLS is to exploit the physical characteristics of wireless channel and maximize the uncertainty about the source messages at the eavesdropper [1] .
Recently, there are growing interests in the wireless cooperative networks. Of particular note is that beamforming is an effective strategy, which can be adopted by relays to enhance the security. Assuming that eavesdropper's channel state information (CSI) is perfectly known, Yang et al. [2] - [9] investigate the communication security problem in amplifyand-forward (AF) and decode-and-forward (DF) relay networks. Specifically, Yang et al. [2] investigate the secrecy rate maximization (SRM) beamforming and a low-complexity null-space beamforming scheme for an AF network, and based on the perfect CSI, the null-space scheme is a good alternative in some cases. Wang et al. [3] optimize the beamforming and power allocation for SRM in a multi-pair AF network, and the optimization problem is solved by the proposed algorithm based on approximation methods. Some works also investigate the security of DF networks [4] - [9] . In [4] , assuming the relays can successfully decode the signal, the authors propose the closedform optimal solutions for the DF relay weights based on the perfect CSI, and the iterative algorithm is proposed for the case in which not all relays can successfully decode the signal. In [5] , under the constraint that the rate at the relay is no less than the secrecy rate, the closed-form optimal beamforming and power allocation are proposed for the DF relay network in the case of a single eaveasdropper, and the iterative algorithm is proposed for the case of multiple eavesdroppers. In [6] , the analysis focuses on the DF relay network, where the eavesdropper can overhear the second hop, and based on the perfect CSI, the authors apply the beamforming scheme obtained by maximum ratio transmission technique. Li et al. [7] propose the secrecy rate for the scenario, where the eavesdropper wiretaps on the second hop in the DF relay networks, and the SRM beamforming and power allocation among the source and relay are jointly designed. With regard to the case that the eavesdroppers wiretap on the multi-hop, Lee [8] investigates the power allocation and beamforming design in a peer-to-peer DF system with multiple single-antenna relays, and then, the author extends the design to a multi-cast system with multiple multi-antenna relays and single-antenna eavesdroppers in [9] .
Of particular note is that the eavesdropper's CSI is assumed to be perfectly known in the abovementioned works [2] - [9] , but as we know, the ECSI is not easy to be obtained perfectly, and the robust design is required because the imperfect CSI will influence the secrecy of the network [10] . In [11] - [13] , the authors design the beamforming by semidefinite relaxation (SDR) technique for the more practical scenarios, where only the ECSI is imperfect in AF relay networks. Ng et al. [14] take into consideration imperfect CSI in a DF relay network, and investigate the average secrecy outage capacity maximization, yet the beamforming vectors are not designed by optimization. Zhang and Gursoy et al. of [15] consider a more practical model, where global CSI is imperfect at the DF relay, and design the robust beamforming for the worst-case SRM. It also should be noted that some assume that the power of the source is fixed [2] , [6] , [7] , [15] , which means they do not take into consideration the design of the first hop, which also influences the channel capacity in DF relay networks.
Our work in this paper is different from the aforementioned works in the following aspects: i) We investigate the DF network with two different imperfect CSI models. In practice, the CSI may be imperfect due to some practical issues, and its errors can be modeled differently according to the practical situation [16] . In this case, the SRM problem is more complicated because the problem will involve an infinite number of constraints so that the most abovementioned schemes cannot be totally applied here.
ii) We also take into consideration the design of the first hop, so we jointly optimize the SRM beamforming and the power allocation. It can be observed that the secrecy rate of the two-hop DF transmission is limited to the minimal achievable rate by which the relay can decode the message transmitted from the source, which means the achievable rates in both the first and second hop are important, so the power allocation among the source and the relay is very necessary.
In this paper, we investigate the secrecy problem of a one-way DF relaying network, where a source communicates with the destination via the relay, with the imperfect CSI. There are multiple eavesdroppers potentially wiretapping the confidential information. We assume that there is no direct link between the source and the destination, as well as the source and the eavesdroppers, i.e., the eavesdroppers can only overhear the information of the second hop. We aim to maximize the secrecy rate of the network by optimizing the robust beamforming and power allocation scheme. To begin with, we investigate the worst-case secrecy rate maximization in a practical scenario, where the global CSI is imperfect and the CSI errors are mathematically bounded by ellipsoids. Then, we focus on the Gaussian wiretap model, in which only ECSI is imperfect and the ECSI errors follow Gaussian distribution, and we propose the beamforming and power allocation scheme to maximize a lower bound on the achievable secrecy rate.
Compared with the abovementioned works, our new contributions can be summarized as follows: 1) We investigate two different practical CSI error's models, i.e., the ellipsoid-bounded and Gaussian wiretap model, in a DF relay network in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers, and propose efficient and novel schemes to handle the complicated situations. Our proposed schemes can indeed maximize the secrecy rates for these cases.
2) We proposed a joint beamforming and power allocation design for improving the secrecy rates, but it constitutes a non-convex problem. Then, we propose an efficient algorithm to solve this problem by resorting to the successive convex approximation (SCA) and SDR techniques. Our simulations illustrate the convergence and effectiveness of our algorithm.
Our proposed algorithm can be applied in both the CSI error models, and more details will given in the section III. Furthermore, simulation results validate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme and the convergence of the proposed algorithm.
Notations: Bold upper and lower case letters denote matrices and vectors, respectively. (· )
H denotes the conjugate transpose, respectively. E {· } represents expectation. C N ×M denotes an N × M complex matrix. |· | represents the mode for a complex number.
[· ] + = max (0, · ). ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product; rank (·) is the rank of a matrix. Tr (·) is the trace operator. · represents the Euclidean norm.
represents the property of semidefinite. CN µ, σ 2 denotes the circularly symmetric complex Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance σ 2 .
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a DF relay network with an M -antenna relay, R,
There is no direct link between S and D, as well as S and E k . S communicates with D via the DF relay, and the multiple non-colluding eavesdroppers are supposed to intercept the secrecy information from R. H 1 ∈ C M ×N s , and H 2 ∈ C N d ×M denote the channel between S and R, R and D, respectively. g k ∈ C M ×1 is the channel between R and E k . We suppose that the channel fading is frequency non-selective Rayleigh block fading.
Because of the half-duplex DF relay, the total transmission block time can be divided into two slots. In the first slot, S sends information to the relay R. Transmitted symbol of the source S is denoted by x s with E |x s | 2 = 1. The received signals y r at R can be expressed as
where v ∈ C N s ×1 is the beamforming vector of the source S, and n r ∼ CN 0, σ 2 r I M is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the relay. After the decoding the received signal, R can exploit beamforming w ∈ C M ×1 to secure the information transmission. In the second time slot, R forwards
to the receiver D, wherex s = x s is the decoded signal of R.
Of particular note is that the whole network is to operate under a total power budget (This assumption is very practical and common [17] ), and we apply the power allocation among S and R, so the total transmit power of R and S is limited to
whereP is transmit power budget. Then, the received signals at D and E k can be expressed as
respectively, where
are the AWGN at D and E k , respectively. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that σ 2 r = σ 2 d = σ 2 e k = 1. Thus, the achievable rate at R, and the secrecy rate at D with multiple eavesdroppers [4] , can be expressed as
respectively, where the factor 1/2 stems from the half-duplex operation of the relay. The secrecy rate for the scenario can be expressed as [7] R
III. BEAMFORMING DESIGN FOR SECRECY RATE MAXIMIZATION A. ELLIPSOID-BOUNDED MODEL
In this section, we assume that only imperfect global CSI is available at the relay (global CSI may be imperfect due to some practical issues). The CSI error in H 1 , H 2 , and g k is modeled as
whereH i , i = {1, 2} and E i are the estimated channels and channel errors of main channels;g k and e k are those of eavesdroppers'. In this section, we assume that all channel errors are bounded by ellipsoids such that
where B i 0 and B k 0 determine the shape and size of the uncertainty regions. We aim to maximize the worst-case secrecy rate subject to the total power budget by designing the the beamforming vectors. The original optimization problem can be formulated as
Obviously, (9) is not a convex problem, then we can introduce a slack variable t, and the problem can be rewritten as
It can be seen that the objective function is linear now, yet the constraints (10b) and (10c) are still non-convex. So, this problem is still very hard to solve due to the fractional form and infinitely constraints on the CSI error.
1) TRANSFORMATION OF (10b)
We let W = ww H , V = vv H , then, by employing the SDR technique and dropping the rank-one constraint for W and V, (10b) can be rewritten as
which can be further transformed into
where s is a slack variable. According to the fact that
Transformation of (13) : The constraint (13) can be expressed as
where δ 1 = vec E H 1 and α 1 = vec H 1 . Similarly, (10e) can be expressed as
Transformation of (14) and (15): To handle the constraint (14) , we introduce the following lemma Lemma 1 (S-Procedure [18] ): Let f k (x), k = 1, 2, be defined as
holds if and only if there exists a µ such that
provided there exists a pointx with f 1 x > 0. Then, according to Lemma 1, (14) and (15) hold if and only if there exists a µ 1 ≥ 0 such that
Then, we introduce the following lemma: Lemma 2 (Schur complement [18] ): Let (14) and (15) can be transformed into
Then, we introduce auxiliary variable Z 1 ∈ C M ×M and let
then, (17) can be expressed as
Using Lemma 2, (18) can be expressed as
Now, the constraint (10b) and (10e) can be transformed into two convex constraints, i.e., (19) and (20) . Then, we put our focus on the constraints of the second slot, i.e., (10c) and (10f).
2) TRANSFORMATION OF (10c)
To make the problem more tractable, we introduce slack variables m and n k , then (10c) can be transformed into
The above constraints are still complicated due to the infinitely many constraints in (21a) and (21b).
Transformation of (21a): Similar to (10b), the constraint (21a) can be expressed as
where δ 2 = vec E H 2 , α 2 = vec H 2 . According to lemma 1, (23) and (10f) hold if and only if there exists µ 2 ≥ 0 such that
Similar to the transformation of (16), (24) can be expressed as
Transformation of (21b): As we can see, (25a) and (25b) are convex. Then, (21b) can be expressed as
which can be recast as
According to Lemma 1, (10d) and (27) can be transformed into the following equivalent convex constraint
where λ ≥ 0. Transformation of (21c): Then, we notice that (21c) is difficult to handle because of its fractional form. We can find that m > 0 and n k > 0, so we can introduce slack variables x and y k to use the exponential forms to represent m and n k , i.e., e x = m and e y k = n k , then, we can express the right-hand VOLUME 4, 2016 side of (21c) as e x−y k . Based on the idea of SCA, (21c) can be expressed as
We find the (29b) and (29c) are non-convex constraints based on the fact that if a constraint is that a convex function is smaller than or equal to a concave function, the constraint is a convex constraint [18] . We observe that the left-hand functions of (29b) and (29c) are convex, but we can transform them into linear functions by the first-order Taylor expansion (FOTE). The FOTE of (29b) around the pointsỹ k is
The FOTE of (29c) around the pointsx andỹ k is
It can be seen that (30) and (31) are convex constraints now. Then, we can transform the power constraint (10g) into
Up till now, the original problem (5) can be recast as
(12), (19) , (20) It is noted that the approximations are tight at x =x and y k =ỹ k , k ∈ K. According to the idea of SCA, the approximations can be improved with the current optimal solution x * , y * k , k ∈ K, iteratively until the predefined stopping criterion is met. We propose the iterative Algorithm 1 1 to solve the above problem.
We can get the solution (V, W) of (33) by our algorithm. Then, we can get the beamforming vectors via eigenvalue decomposition if the ranks of V and W are one; otherwise, some rank-one approximation technique, e.g., Gaussian randomization [19] , can be applied obtain v and w.
B. GAUSSIAN WIRETAP MODEL
In this section, we aim to design the beamforming for the Gaussian wiretap model. In practice, the legitimate users' CSI is easier to be obtained perfectly (the instantaneous CSI of the legitimate channels can be obtained via pilot-assisted channel estimation and feedback), compared with that of the eavesdroppers, because the eavesdroppers always have a good hiding feature. In this section, we assume that the main channels H 1 and H 2 are perfectly known at the relay, Substitute (38) into (6), then, we can use the similar approximations to solve the optimization problem. Specifically, the problem can be expressed as
where t is a slack variable. (39b) can be equally expressed as a convex constraint as follows
Then, it can be seen that (39c) is the only non-convex constraint that we need to tackle. Then, by introducing p and q k as slack variables, (39c) can be transformed into
It is noted that (41a) and (41b) are typical convex constraints, while (41c) is non-convex. Similar to (21c), we can transform (41c) into
Then, just like the way to find (x,ỹ k ) in the previous section, (ũ,ṽ k ) can be updated by the optimal solution of each iteration, i.e., (ũ,ṽ k ) = u * , v * k . The Algorithm 1 can be also applied here. As mentioned above, the beamforming vectors v and w can be obtained by eigenvalue decomposition or rank-one approximation technique, e.g. Gaussian randomization [19] .
IV. SIMULATIONS
In this section, the simulations are provided to illustrate the secrecy performance of the proposed design for ellipsoidbounded model and Gaussian model. In the simulations, we assume that all generated channels are Rayleigh flat fading channels. Without the loss of generality, in the ellipsoidbounded model, the CSI errors are bounded by spheres, i.e., B i = B k = ρI, i = {1, 2}, k ∈ K, where ρ is the mismatch parameter. We use the numerical solvers, i.e., SeDuMi [21] , to solve the optimization problems and all of the simulation results are generated by Monte-Carlo experiments.
In Fig. 2 , the convergence of our proposed algorithm is illustrated. In this simulation, we set K = 2, M = N d = 4, N s = 2 andP = 10W in the ellipsoid-bounded model. From the Fig. 2 , we can observe that the convergence of Algorithm 1 is fast, and the secrecy rate increases monotonically.
In Fig. 3 , the worst-case secrecy rate in the ellipsoidbounded model is depicted versusP for ρ = 0.8, N s = 2 and M = N d = 4. For comparison, we simulate the worstcase non-robust secrecy rate, and in the non-robust scheme, we treat the estimated CSIH 1 ,H 2 andg k , k ∈ K, as the perfect CSI. From Fig. 3 , we can observe that our proposed robust scheme outperforms the non-robust one. To prove that the proper power allocation is important in the network, we introduce a benchmark scheme, in which we still design the robust beamforming by the optimization, but set Tr (V) ≤ 2P/3, and Tr (W) ≤P/3 instead of optimizing the power allocation among the source and the relay, and we can see that our proposed design has better secrecy performance. Besides, we also solve the problem with the perfect global CSI, and we can see that if the global CSI is all perfect, the secrecy rate will be better. Moreover, it can also be seen that as the number of the eavesdroppers increases, the worst-case secrecy rate will decreases, and this is because more power will be coordinated to interfere with more eavesdroppers. Fig. 4 shows that the secrecy rate versus the mismatch parameters (ρ, τ ) andP with M = N d = 4, N s = 2 and K = 1. In this simulation, we assume that the legitimate channels, i.e., H 1 and H 2 , are perfectly known at the relay, and only the eavesdropper's CSI is imperfect. The result verifies the fact that as the mismatch parameters increase, the secrecy rate will also increase. It also should be noted that the mismatch on the Gaussian wiretap model has greater impact than that on the ellipsoid-bounded model, especially whenP is high. Moreover, it can also be seen that when the mismatch parameters ρ and τ are very small, the secrecy rates of these two models will increase very slightly as the transmit power increases.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigate the joint robust beamforming and power allocation design in a wiretap DF relay network with imperfect CSI in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. First, our proposed scheme maximizes the worst-case secrecy rate in the ellipsoid-bounded model, then, we also investigate the scheme to maximize the lower bound of the secrecy rate of the Gaussian wiretap model. Our proposed design constitutes non-convex problems, and we propose an iterative algorithm based on the idea of SCA and SDR. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the algorithm can be validated from the simulation. 
